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ABSTRACT 
Katja Greeson: The Great Defenders?: The Impact of Eurosceptics in Government on Youth 
Support 
(Under the direction of John Stephens) 
 
The age gap in support for the European Union, wherein young people are more likely to 
support the EU, is a well-known phenomenon. However, little is known about how changing 
national political contexts moderate this effect, particularly in regard to increasing electoral 
success of Eurosceptic parties. The purpose of this article is to assess how the presence of 
Eurosceptic parties in government changes the tendency of young people to support integration 
and pro-EU parties. I also test whether the type of Eurosceptic party (GAL vs. TAN and “soft” 
vs. “hard”) in government matters. Based on a multilevel analysis of 2016 European Social 
Survey data for 18 countries, I conclude that young Europeans are more likely to support the EU 
and pro-EU parties in countries where the Eurosceptic party in office is a TAN or “hard” 
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Extensive research has pointed to an age gap in support for the European Union, with 
young people more likely than older individuals to support European integration (Inglehart, 
1970; Gabel, 1998; Di Mauro & Fraile, 2012; Janssen, 1991; Fox & Pearce, 2017; Hobolt, 2009). 
Consequently, young people should also be more likely to support pro-EU parties. However, the 
success of Eurosceptic parties has changed political dynamics at the national electoral level. 
Euroscepticism refers to “scepticisim about Europe or European integration” (Hooghe & Marks, 
2007, p. 120) and has been described from a political party perspective as the rivalry between 
mainstream and challenger parties (Sitter, 2001; Szczerbiak & Taggart 2000, 2003). Thus far, 
little research has been conducted on the contextual conditions of the aforementioned age gap, 
particularly in regard to the increased success of Eurosceptic parties. In extending the existing 
research on youth support for the EU and pro-EU parties to account for changing political 
dynamics, we can better predict how youth support will change in the near future and the 
consequences it may have for politics at the national level and on further European integration.  
In this research, I seek to establish how the tendency of young people to support EU 
integration and pro-EU parties changes in countries where Eurosceptic parties have been 
electorally successful in asking the following research question: To what extent does the 
electoral success of Eurosceptic parties at the national level moderate the impact of age on 
likelihood to express support for the EU and pro-EU parties? 
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  I expect that young Europeans, who have more to gain from a strong EU and are more 
likely to identify as European, are likely to perceive the election of Eurosceptic parties as a threat 
and be galvanized to express even greater affinity for European integration and support for pro-
EU parties (Lutz, Kritzinger & Skirbekk, 2006; Arts & Halman, 2007; Hooghe & Marks, 2008).  
Extant research has also revealed how diverse the field of Eurosceptic parties is, falling 
across the full range of the left/right ideological spectrum and advocating for an array of 
different policy outcomes related to integration. Therefore, I argue that the type of Eurosceptic 
party in elected office will matter; young people will be further motivated to support the EU and 
pro-EU parties when TAN and “hard” Eurosceptic parties are electorally successful. Hooghe and 
Marks found that Eurosceptic parties do not fall exclusively on either side of the left-right 
spectrum, but rather on either pole of the ‘new politics’ GAL/TAN dimension (Hooghe & Marks, 
2008). GAL (green/alternative/libertarian) parties are more supportive of postmaterialist values 
such as civil liberty, climate change, and the role of citizens in governing. Conversely, TAN 
(traditional/authoritarian/nationalist) parties are defined by their opposition to immigration, 
commitment to law and order, and nationalist sentiments (Hooghe & Marks, 2008). As young 
people are more aligned with the postmaterialist values of GAL parties and less likely to hold 
exclusively nationalist identities (Polk, et al., 2012; Janssen, 1991), it follows suit that they 
would feel less threatened by GAL-leaning parties. Similarly, the heightened threat of a party 
that advocates for a “hard” withdrawal from the EU versus a “softer”, reform-minded approach 
will also be likely to lead young people to increase support for the EU and pro-EU parties.  
Given results from the most recent European Parliament election in May 2019, the 
success of Eurosceptic parties shows no signs of abating, so it is essential that we understand 
how their electoral success may impact the behavior of young people, a critical block of EU 
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supporters. The likelihood of supporting the EU typically declines with age, but if young people 
are reinvigorated in their support of integration and are actually more likely to support pro-EU 
parties, perhaps what many have painted as the “crisis for the future of Europe” may actually be 
a catalyst for a more united Europe in the long term. A better understanding of youth attitudes in 
the context of these shifting political forces is an asset as we look to the future of integration.  
 For the purpose of testing these claims, I will use 2016 European Social Survey Round 8  
data on support for pro-EU parties. This edition of the European Social Survey provides data for 
18 EU member countries, across all regions of Europe. Using multi-level regression modelling, I 
will assess whether Eurosceptic party electoral success has a moderative effect on the effects of 
age in determining the likelihood to profess pro-integration attitudes and to support pro-EU 
parties. 
 In this Master’s thesis, I first present my argument based on a review of the literature 
regarding youth support for the EU; the increasing salience of Euroscepticism in national party 
politics and electoral success of Eurosceptic parties at the national level; and relevant variations 
in the types of Eurosceptic parties. Next, I discuss the operationalization of my research using 
2016 European Social Survey data capturing attitudes toward integration and support for pro-EU 
parties (by feeling “close” to a party and vote choice). Subsequently, I provide results of three  
multi-level regression analyses, and conclude with the implications of the findings and 
opportunities for future research. 
 
II. ARGUMENTS AND HYPOTHESES 
The majority of research has concluded that age is a key factor in predicting support for 
the EU; young Europeans are more supportive than older individuals (Inglehart, 1970; Gabel, 
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1998; Di Mauro & Fraile, 2012; Janssen, 1991; Guerra & Serricchio, 2014). This scholarship is 
supported by electoral results. During the most recent referendum on EU membership in the 
United Kingdom in May 2016, approximately 61% of people under 30-years-old voted to remain 
in the EU contrasted with just 30% of people over 65 (“Should We Stay or Should We Go”, 
2016). As recently as April 2019, Eurobarometer polling showed that 68% of 18 to 24-year-olds 
were more likely to support EU membership, higher than any other age group (Schulmeister et 
al., 2019). The determinants of this age gap have been explored extensively. Three explanations 
are particularly relevant in explaining the likelihood that support declines with age: 
utilitarianism, cognitive mobilization, and identitarianism. 
Utilitarian explanations have focused on economic motivations for support. Self-
interested, or “pocketbook” , motivations focus on an individual’s economic experiences and 
their perception of them (Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2011). This argument suggests that 
globalization has produced winners and losers, and evidence shows that these “winners” are far 
more likely to support the EU (Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Grimm, Pollock & Ellison 2018; Gabel, 
1998). Individuals with greater human capital will be able to adjust more easily to changing labor 
markets prompted by neoliberal European economic policies (Hooghe & Marks, 2005). Young 
people, who are more educated (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), “cosmopolitan, mobile, and flexible” 
(Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2011, p. 10) are more likely to benefit economically from 
membership.  
Expansion of higher education has also led to greater cognitive mobilization, which in 
turn has produced greater support for international organizations (Inglehart, 1970; Di Mauro & 
Fraile, 2012; Guerra & Serricchio, 2014; McLaren, 2006), and has been linked specifically to 
support for the EU (Gabel, 1998; Grimm et al., 2018). Political sophistication, too, has an 
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important effect, and evidence suggests that the young are likely to possess more of it (Fox & 
Pearce, 2017). When citizens have the political skills to obtain information and conceptualize 
accurately the role of the EU, they are less threatened by it (Inglehart, 1977; Janssen, 1991; 
Gabel, 1998). Harkening back to economic explanations, research has shown that individuals 
with greater political sophistication are also less likely to rely on “pocketbook” voting (Gomez & 
Wilson, 2007). This is important, because it may explain why young Europeans, although being 
the age group most impacted by the Eurozone crisis and resulting high unemployment, are still 
more likely to support the EU when many criticized the EU and pro-EU, mainstream parties for 
poorly handling the situation. Perhaps greater political sophistication allowed young people to 
better divorce themselves from individual economic situations and assess that a multitude of 
influences contributed to the crisis. 
Alternative postfunctionalist theories of European integration place emphasis on identity 
in addition to utilitarian factors, and it is clear that young people are more likely to hold a 
European identity in addition to a national one (Fligstein, 2008; Hooghe & Marks, 2008; Arts & 
Halman, 2007; Lutz et al. 2006; Hooghe & Marks, 2004). Jennings and Niemi devised the 
impressionable years theory of political socialization, wherein individuals are most susceptible to 
influence from outside forces on their political attitudes and habits in youth (1981). These 
attitudes are carried with them into adulthood when they are less susceptible to external 
influences (Jennings & Niemi, 1981). Young Europeans were socialized in a united Europe, so it 
follows that they perceive a supranational authority and weaker national powers as normal 
(Inglehart, 1970; Down & Wilson, 2012). The young have also been a target of intentional 
efforts to increase a sense of European identity through programs like Erasmus (Brooks, 2009), 
with further research confirming the effectiveness of these types of programs (Mitchell 2012, 
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2015). The expanded opportunities that younger generations have had in cross-national 
experiences have made them “more likely to know second languages, be educated, travel, and be 
more open to the EU” (Fligstein, 2008, p. 157).  
Given the astounding amount of research that shows that youth are more likely to support 
the European Union integration project, I expect this support to translate into political 
attachments that make them more likely to support pro-EU parties. This leads to my first 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Young people are more likely than older individuals to support pro-EU 
parties. 
 
 Little is known, however, about how the effect of youth support for the EU and pro-EU 
parties is moderated by shifting political dynamics, particularly regarding recent electoral 
successes of Eurosceptic parties. In the 2014 European Parliament elections, Eurosceptic parties 
won seats in 23 of 28 member states, leading to an overall share of 29% of seats in the legislative 
body (Brack, 2015; Desilver, 2019). Preliminary results show that in the May 2019 European 
Parliament elections, roughly a quarter of seats will be held by Eurosceptic parties (Crisp, 2019). 
These electoral gains have not been confined to the supranational level: Eurosceptic parties have 
entered government or increased their share of seats in national elections in Austria, Germany, 
Hungary, etc. Their rise has increased the salience of “the issue of Europe” and the legitimacy of 
Eurosceptic ideology in national party politics.  
 The period prior to the Maastricht Accord in 1991 was characterized by permissive 
consensus, in which the public passively accepted an integration process that was driven by elites 
 7 
(Hooghe & Marks, 2008). Since then – through the failed ratification of the EU Constitution, 
Eurozone crisis, and migration crisis - European integration has become more important in 
national political dialogues and vice versa. The increasing salience of the EU issue can be 
partially credited to radical right Eurosceptic parties, which have demonstrated increasing 
attention towards the issue in their political agendas over time (Vasilopoulou, 2018). Voters have 
increasingly considered European issues in national political decisions, dubbed “EU voting” 
(Tillman, 2004). De Vries advanced understanding of this phenomenon in findings that revealed 
the moderating effects of high partisan conflict over integration and a greater degree of issue 
salience among voters (De Vries, 2007; Kriesi, 2007).  
 Studies have not yet fully investigated the relationship between “EU voting” in national 
elections and age, but taking into consideration the significant threat that Eurosceptic parties 
pose to the longevity of the European project that young people largely support, I expect the 
issue is particularly salient for young voters. Additionally, given the more profound benefits of 
EU membership for younger people, I expect the rising threat posed by Eurosceptic parties to 
galvanize young people to support the EU even further.  
Movements like Pulse of Europe, a pro-European citizen-driven initiative which started 
in 2017 as a rallying cry for European integration in response to the Brexit vote, prove that the 
increase in anti-EU voices has inspired action already (Hartleb, 2017). Also, youth turnout was 
higher than normal during the Brexit membership referendum when a higher than average, 64% 
of registered 18 to 24-year-olds went to the polls (Helm, 2016), suggesting that the threat to EU 
membership did in fact motivate this demographic to rally behind the EU at a time of crisis. Even 
more convincing is the evidence of the “youthquake” during the United Kingdom’s 2017 
national elections just one year after Brexit when, according to exit polling, 64% of 18 to 24-
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year-olds turned out to vote (Sloam & Rakib Ehsan, 2017). This represented a 21% increase over 
the most recent election in 2015 and the highest youth turnout recorded since the 1990s. The 
higher turnout was not reflected elsewhere in the population, suggesting that youth were 
disproportionately compelled to increase their participation. Estimates suggest too that the 
success of the Labour Party – which advocated to remain in the EU during the referendum - was 
largely due to increased youth support (Sloam & Rakib Ehsan, 2017). In post-election polling, 
Brexit was cited as the second most important issue next to the economy (which could feasibly 
also be tied to Brexit) by 18-24-year-olds, proving how critical the issue was for these voters in 
their decision on whether to participate and who to vote for.  
This is evidence from a singular case, but I anticipate its generalizability; as Eurosceptic 
parties continue to find electoral success at the national level, young people will be more likely 
to perceive them as a threat and be encouraged to express more positive attitudes toward the EU 
and greater support for pro-EU parties in defense of European integration. As such, my second 
hypothesis asserts that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The tendency of young people to express pro-integration attitudes and 
support pro-EU parties in national elections is increased in countries where Eurosceptic 
parties have been electorally successful. 
 
 Moreover, I predict that the electoral presence of some Eurosceptic parties will be more 
likely than others to increase the likelihood that young people support pro-EU parties, 
particularly in regard to two variant typologies, 1) “hard” versus “soft” and 2) GAL versus TAN.  
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 Firstly, “hard” Eurosceptics are defined by an outright rejection of the existence of the 
EU and/or their country’s membership in it (Taggard & Szerbiak, 2008). “Soft” Euroscepticism, 
on the other hand, is based on dissatisfaction with certain aspects of European integration and is 
more focused on reforming the institution (Taggard & Szerbiak, 2008). The costs of exiting the 
EU would be greater for young people than older people. The young are more likely to be 
actively looking for work than older age groups, and an exit would limit opportunities to work 
abroad. On a broader scale, the overall health of a country’s economy would likely suffer upon 
exiting the EU, and since the young are a particularly vulnerable population with less wealth 
amassed, they would be disproportionately harmed (Saker-Clark, 2016). What is more, the 
prospect of a “hard” exit is a threat to legal rights as citizens of the EU, posing a threat to the 
very essence of European identity, which as previously noted is more prevalent among the 
young.  
In contrast, the “soft” Eurosceptic approach would not pose as significant a risk. Many 
young Europeans may be open to - and even advocates for - reform of the EU, which has been 
criticized for its democratic deficit and post-Eurozone crisis economic policies on the grounds 
that it could actually improve their economic situation and strengthen their roles as citizens of 
Europe. Therefore, because young people have more at stake economically and from an identity 
perspective, I predict them to be even more galvanized to support pro-EU parties in countries 
where there is a “hard” Eurosceptic party in government.  
 Secondly, the GAL (green/alternative/libertarian) /TAN 
(traditional/authoritarian/nationalist) dimension was first discovered and coined by Hooghe and 
Marks, who posited that the “rise of issues concerned with lifestyle, ecology, cultural diversity, 
nationalism, and immigration” were responsible for the introduction of this “new politics” 
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spectrum of political attitudes (2002, p. 976). Eurosceptic parties cannot be differentiated based 
on the traditional economic left/right continuum, but they exist on opposite extremes of 
GAL/TAN. GAL parties, concerned with “ecology, alternative politics, and libertarianism” see 
the EU as weakening democracy, disempowering the public, and promoting neoliberal economic 
policies. At the opposite pole, TAN parties are concerned with threats to national sovereignty, 
immigration, and generally, to international agencies. The idea of an exclusive national identity 
threatened by further integration is essential to an understanding of TAN anti-EU motivations. 
TAN party platforms are the antithesis of the EU’s aims, so they act as the primary drivers in the 
debate on the EU, and make up the largest portion of Eurosceptic parties (Hooghe & Marks, 
2002).   
 Young people are less likely to support TAN parties for three reasons. First, younger 
generations are less likely to associate with traditional nationalist sentiments that are so innate to 
TAN party values (Ford & Goodwin, 2014; Fox & Pearce, 2017). Young Europeans have grown 
up in a far more ethnically diverse Europe than ever before (Maxwell, 2016), and this familiarity 
with diversity is likely to make them more open to other cultures and immigration. This is further 
backed by evidence that the influence of populist right parties does not affect people who can 
conceive of themselves as having more than one identity (inclusive identities) (Hooghe & Marks, 
2008; de Vries & Edwards, 2009). The TAN nationalist sentiment is associated with a distrust of 
other cultures and perceived threat of immigration, both of which are less consistent with the 
values of  young people who are more accepting of cultural diversity and less concerned about 
immigration (Costa-Lopes & Vala, 2010). Second, GAL parties are more likely to advocate for 
EU reform and TAN parties for a “harder” approach. This point harkens back to the expectations 
that young people will be less likely to support parties that advocate for complete eradication of 
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the EU or membership therein. Third, each successive generation has increasingly adopted 
postmaterialist values such as environmental protection, gender equality and quality of life over 
economic concerns, which are overwhelmingly aligned with GAL parties and at odds with the 
interests of TAN parties (Inglehart, 1970; Janssen 1991).  
Taking into consideration the GAL/TAN dimension and the difference between “hard” 
and “soft” Eurosceptics, my third hypothesis becomes more nuanced. I predict that the effects of 
the presence of TAN and “hard” Eurosceptic parties in elected office will further intensify the 
relationship between age and pro-EU attitudes and support for pro-EU parties. Accordingly, my 
third and final hypothesis states: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The tendency of young people to express pro-integration attitudes and 
support pro-EU parties in national elections is even more pronounced when the 
Eurosceptic party(s) in national office are “hard” Eurosceptics or fall onto the TAN side 
of the GAL/TAN spectrum. 
 
 In the following section, I describe my quantitative approach to test these hypotheses 
using data from the 2016 European Social Survey.  
 
 
III. DATA AND METHODS 
In this analysis, I will use the 2016 European Social Survey Round 8 to test the impact of 
contextual variables denoting Eurosceptic party success at the national level on the effect of age 
on the likelihood of expressing support for EU integration and pro-EU parties. The timing of this 
particular round of the European Social Survey was conducted at a time when focus on the EU 
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was heightened as a result of Brexit and growing Eurosceptic forces in other parts of Europe, so 
it is ideal for the purpose of this analysis which gauges the effect of the rise of such forces.  
Field work began on 22 August 2016 in Norway and continued through 28 December 
2017 in Austria and Lithuania, and interviews were conducted via face-to-face interviews. The 
universe of the survey includes individuals over age 15 who are residents of the 23 countries 
included in this round of the survey, regardless of citizenship status. Of the countries included, 
there are 18 member countries of the European Union: Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Germany, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Spain, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and Slovenia. Notably, ten member countries are not 
included in the survey and consequently are not considered in this research: Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Denmark, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Norway, Slovakia, and Romania. Throughout my 
analysis, I include post-stratification weights to account for differences in probabilities of being 
included in the survey. 
 
Independent Variable 
For the purposes of this study, I consider young Europeans to be between 18 and 29-
years-old, following the example of extant research that has utilized this definition. The 
European Social Survey provides a continuous variable for age, which I have recoded as a 
dummy variable (Variable Name: Age18to29) with “1” if the respondent is between 18 and 29 




In order to fully capture the effect of age and electoral success of Eurosceptic parties on 
attitudes and party support, I present multilevel logistic regression results for the effects on three 
separate dependent variables.  
First, I use a dependent variable measuring support for pro-EU parties. Respondents were 
asked the question, “To which party do you feel closest to?”, and were given the options of 
political parties in each respective country. I used these responses to create my dependent 
variable for “support for pro-EU parties” (Variable Name: ProEUSupport) in conjunction with 
data from the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey on Political Parties (CHES). CHES provides 
scores for the position of political parties on a variety of issues based on expert assessments from 
political scientists specializing in political parties. I use the 2014 dataset because it is the last set 
of scores available prior to the 2016 European Social Survey data. For the purposes of creating 
my dependent variable, support for pro-EU parties, I categorized political parties as Eurosceptic 
using the variable “EU_Position”, which measures the “overall orientation of the party 
leadership towards European integration” in a given year on a seven-point scale from 1 “Strongly 
opposed” to 7, “Strongly in favor”. 4 is considered “Neutral”. For my purposes, I consider any 
party that was assigned a score of  5 to 7 as pro-EU.  
The second dependent variable I investigate measures reported vote for Eurosceptic 
parties using the question “Which party did you vote for in that election?”, referring to the most 
recent national election in each respective country. Again, respondents were able to select from 
relevant parties in each country. I utilized the same pro-EU coding approach using CHES data as 
previously described to create a dummy variable for “vote for pro-EU parties” (Variable Name: 
VoteProEU).  
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Lastly, I use an attitudinal measure of support for the EU as my third dependent variable. 
The question I used to evaluate support for EU integration is: “Now thinking about the European 
Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. 
Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?” Respondents were 
given a 10-point scale ranging from 0 for “Unification already gone too far” to 10 for 
“Unification go further”. Again, I created a dummy variable to indicate support for EU 
integration (Variable Name: SupportIntegration), by coding anyone who responded between 6 
and 10 as supportive.  
 
Contextual Variables 
In creating my contextual variables, I relied on two data sources: ParlGov and the CHES. 
I use the CHES data for variables measuring party position on Europe, position on the 
GAL/TAN spectrum, and classification as a “hard” or “soft” party.  Using the same 7-point EU 
position score that I used to create my primary independent variable, I categorized any party with 
a score of 1 (strongly opposed) to 3 as Eurosceptic. The CHES dataset also includes a score 
measuring placement on the GAL/TAN spectrum from 0 for “Libertarian/Postmaterialist” to 10 
for “Traditional/Authoritarian”. I categorized any party assigned a score from 6 to 10 as TAN. 
Using these datasets in conjunction, I created dummy variables for Eurosceptic party and TAN 
party presence in the governing coalition (Variable Names: ESinGovt and TANinGovt). There 
are six parties in governing coalitions across five countries that fit the specifications as 
Eurosceptic. Three parties in governing coalitions across three countries qualify as TAN parties. 
Notably, there are no political parties in Spain nor Estonia that could be categorized as 
Eurosceptic using my coding mechanisms. 
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The CHES data does not include an explicit score measuring “hard” versus “soft” 
Eurosceptic parties, so I rely on prior definitions from Treib and Hobolt and de Vries (2014; 
2016). They categorized political parties as “hard” Eurosceptics if they received a CHES 
EU_Position score of below 2.7 (on the same 1 to 7 scale) and a left-right score of above 5 (scale 
from 0 for “Extreme left” to 10 for “Extreme right”). I created my third contextual variable, a 
dummy for presence of “hard” Eurosceptic parties in office (Variable Name: HardinGovt) using 
the same specifications. Two parties in governing coalitions are considered to be “hard” 
Eurosceptics.  
I gathered data on party presence in national governing coalitions from ParlGov 
(parliaments and governments database) which provides results for approximately 1,600 parties, 
950 elections, and 1,500 cabinets. Their “cabinets” dataset provides detailed information on each 
government elected and which parties make up the governing coalition. 
I chose to use presence of Eurosceptic parties in the governing coalition instead of the 
mere presence of any Eurosceptic parties in parliament, because it better targets the effect of a 
visible Eurosceptic presence that young people are more likely to perceive as a threat. The 
percentage of Eurosceptic parties in national parliaments ranged from 0% in Estonia and Spain to 
70% in Hungary. The average across countries is 27%. All but two countries in this study, 
Estonia and Spain, had some percentage of Eurosceptic party representation in parliament, 
limiting the variation necessary for fruitful analysis. I also considered setting a threshold for a 
specific percentage of national parliaments that would represent a Eurosceptic party threat, but 
this seemed theoretically arbitrary. Also, we might expect that a Eurosceptic prime minister 
would be the most obvious exhibition of Eurosceptic party electoral success, so I initially 
planned to include a variable for the existence of a Eurosceptic prime minister. However, after 
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further investigation, I found that countries with a Eurosceptic prime minister were exactly the 
same as countries with a Eurosceptic party in the governing coalition, owing to the fact that 
prime ministers are typically representative of the majority parties. Given these considerations, 
the advantage of using a measure of party presence in governing coalitions is clear. Table 1 
shows my assignment of parties and countries into Eurosceptic, TAN, and “hard” Eurosceptic 
categories.  
 
Table 1: Categorization of Eurosceptic Parties by TAN vs. GAL and Hard vs. Soft 
Country Party In Govt TAN 
             
Hard 
Austria        
  Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)  ● ● 
  Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)  ●   
  Team Stronach for Austria  ●   
  Pirate Party of Austria     
Belgium        
  People's Party (PP)  ● ● 
  Flemish Interest (VB)   ● ● 
   Labour Party (PVDA+)     
Czechia        
  Dawn of Direct Democracy of Tomio Okamura  ●   
  Party of Free Citizens   ● 
  Civic Democratic Party (ODS)  ●   
  
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia 
(KSČM) 
 
●   
Finland        
  True Finns Party ● ● ● 
  Christian Democrats  ●   
  Centre Party ●    
France        
  The Movement for France (MPF)  ● ● 
  National Front (FN)  ● ● 
  Ensemble     
  French Communist Party (PCF)     
  Left Party (PG)     
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Germany        
  Alternative for Germany (AfD)  ● ● 
  National Democratic Party (NPD)  ● ● 
  Left Party of Democratic Socialism (Die Linke)    
Hungary        
  4. Jobbik   ● ● 
  3. Fidesz  ● ●   
Ireland        
  
1. Anti-Austerity Alliance - People Before 
Profit    
  9. Socialist Party – United Left Alliance     
  7. Sinn Féin - Ourselves Alone     
Italy        
  Brothers of Italy (FdI)  ● ● 
  Lega Nord  ● ● 
  Forza Italia  ●   
  Communist Refoundation Party     
  Left Ecology Freedom (SEL)     
  Five Star Movement (M5S)     
Lithuania        
  Political Party 'The Way of Courage'  ●   
  Party Order and Justice (TT) ● ●   
  Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union (LVZS)        ●    
Netherlands        
  Reformed Political Party (SGP)  ● ● 
  Party for Freedom (PVV)   ● ● 
  Christian Union (CU)   ●   
  Party for the Animals (PvdD)     
  Socialist Party (SP)     
Poland        
  Congress of the New Right  ● ● 
  United Poland  ●   
  Law and Justice Party ● ● ● 
Portugal        
  Earth Party (MPT)  ●   
  
Unitarian Democratic Coalition (PCP-PEV-
CDU)    
  Left Block (B.E.)     
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Slovenia        
  United Left     
Sweden        
  Sweden Democrats   ● ● 
  Feminist Initiative (FI)     
  The Pirate Party     
  Left party     
United Kingdom      
  UK Independence Party (UKIP)  ● ● 
  Conservative ● ●   
Notes: (1) A distinction regarding the German CDU/CSU should be noted: While the European 
Social Survey combines CDU and CSU together, the CHES has different scores for EU_Position 
(CDU = 6.38, CSU = 4.85). Despite CSU’s apparent Eurosceptic rating, I have coded them 
jointly as pro-EU given the CDU’s prevalence throughout Germany as opposed to the CSU’s 
regional dominance. (2) This chart reflects categorization in 2016, which may have shifted in 




Relevant individual-level control variables are also included. Gender, education level, 
and income are included as controls because I expect that being male, more highly educated, and 
in a higher income bracket will increase the likelihood of supporting the EU (Hobolt & de Vries, 
2016; Hobolt, 2009). I also control for being unemployed, satisfaction with national government, 
and level of political interest, as these have been found to relate to degree of EU supportiveness 
(Hobolt & de Vries, 2016; Hobolt, 2009; de Vries et al., 2011; van Spanje & de Vreese, 2011; 
Hernandez & Kriesi, 2016).  Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Table 2.  
I use three multilevel logistic regression models leaving countries random and 
incorporating cross-level interactions between age and my contextual variables to see what 
moderative effect the presence of Eurosceptic parties has on age in determining the likelihood to 
support pro-EU parties. Prior research has confirmed the effect of country variation in explaining 
support for pro-EU parties (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2010). In utilizing a logistic mixed effects 
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model, I control for any between-country variation given the likelihood that people within 
countries are likely to be more similar than individuals in other countries. The 28,489 
observations I observe are clustered into 18 country groups. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name Min Max N Mean St. Dev. 
Dependent Variable 
     
SupportProEU 0 1 35,450 0.30 0.46 
VoteProEU  0 1 35,450 0.46 0.50 
SupportIntegration 0 1 35,450 0.39 0.49 
Primary Independent Variable     
Age18to29 0 1 35,450 0.17 0.37 
Contextual Variables 
    
ESinGovt 0 1 35,450 0.26 0.44 
TANinGovt 0 1 35,450 0.15 0.36 
HardinGovt 0 1 35,451 0.10 0.30 
Control Variables 
     
Gender 0 (male) 1 (female) 35,447 0.52 0.50 




35,266 3.83 1.85 
Unemployed 0 1 35,450 0.06 0.24 
Income 1 (lowest) 10 (highest) 29,113 5.45 2.73 




34,614 4.32 2.36 




35,373 2.37 0.91 
 
 
I conduct ten separate models each for my three separate dependent variables to assess 
the impact of age and my contextual variables on likelihood to support pro-EU parties. For each, 
I begin with a basic model to assess the impact of being young on the dependent variable alone. 
Based on my first hypothesis, I expect the effect to be positive – age will increase likelihood to 
support European integration and support pro-EU parties. In Models 2, 3, and 4, I add the 
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interactions for age and presence of Eurosceptic party, TAN party, and “hard” Eurosceptic party 
in the governing coalition respectively. These cross-level interactions are meant to assess under 
what conditions the effect of age on support changes. Again, a positive effect is expected for 
each interaction.   In Models 7 through 9, I run a series of combinations to assess the effect of 
each interaction when controlling for the other contextual interaction variables. Finally, in Model 
10, I present a full model with all variables included. When the interactions for age and the three 
separate measures of Eurosceptic parties in office are considered, I expect the interaction effects 
to be positive and for the effect of TAN and “hard” parties in government to be intensified as 






Results for Support for Pro-EU Parties 
In Table 3, results are presented for eight models explaining support for pro-EU parties. 
All coefficients are presented as log odds. The intra class correlation (ICC) on the dependent 
variable is 0.40, indicating that 40% of the variation can be explained by between-country 
variation. Most surprising is the evidence clearly contradicting my first hypothesis. Results 
shows that across all models the likelihood of young people supporting pro-EU parties is 
decreased compared to older Europeans. The effects are weakest in Model 1, the base model, 
where the log odds of 18-to-29-year-olds supporting pro-EU parties is -0.39. The effects of this 
trend only increase in Models 2 through 7, when the log odds remain relatively constant.  
 In Model 2, 3 and 4, the variable for presence of Eurosceptic parties in the governing 
coalition, presence of TAN parties in the governing coalition, and presence of “hard” 
Eurosceptic parties in the governing coalition and their interactions with age are added. Although 
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the logged odds run in the expected direction for all Eurosceptic parties and TAN parties, they 
are not statistically significant. However, we find statistically significant and expected results for 
the presence of “hard” Eurosceptic parties. The log odds of young people supporting pro-EU 
parties in countries with a “hard” Eurosceptic party in office is 0.46 and significant to the <0.001 
degree, providing support for part of Hypothesis 3 (young people will be even more likely to 
support pro-EU parties when they live in countries with “hard” Eurosceptic parties in office).  
In Models 5, 6, and 7, I run a combination of contextual variables and their interaction 
effects to gauge the effect of each when controlling for the others. The primary takeaway is that 
in Model 7, I find confirming evidence that even when controlling for TAN parties in 
government, the interaction of being young and presence of “hard” Eurosceptic parties in 
government produces a positive and statistically significant effect. The log odds of supporting 
pro-EU parties are 0.47, even greater than in Model 4. 
Finally, in Model 8, the full model, the effect of the interaction of being young and 
presence of “hard” Eurosceptic parties in government is confirmed and further strengthened. The 
only other contextual variable in this model that demonstrates significance is the interaction of 
age and any Eurosceptic party in government, which shows a negative relationship with support 
for pro-EU parties at the <0.01 level of significance. This finding contradicts Hypothesis 2..  
 Concerning the variation by cluster, we see that much of the variation is attributable to 
between country variance. However, I find that a lot of the variance is assumed by the contextual 
variables when they are added to the model. For example, while in Model 1, the constant for 
country variation is 2.04, in Model 8, with all variables added, that country variation constant 
decreases to 0.65. This is logical given the country-level essence of the three contextual 
variables, but interesting that so much of that variation is attributable to them.  
 
 
Table 3: Explaining Support for Pro-EU Parties in 18 EU Member States 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Coefficient         
Constant -2.95*** -2.43*** -2.51*** -2.62*** -2.43*** -2.44*** -2.3638*** -2.44*** 
Age18to29 -0.39*** -0.42*** -0.40*** -0.42*** -0.42*** -0.42*** -0.43*** -0.42*** 
ESinGovt  -1.81   -0.54** -1.00**  0.80 
Age18to29*ESinGovt  0.12   0.13 -0.03  -0.29** 
TANinGovt   -2.60  -2.12  -2.09* -2.71 
Age18to29*TANinGovt   0.08  -0.03  0.14 0.42 
HardinGovt    -3.01  -2.13 -2.16 -2.66 
Age18to29*HardinGovt    0.46***  0.49 0.47*** 0.74*** 
Gender -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Education 0.037 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Unemployed -0.14* -0.14* -0.14* -0.14* -0.14* -0.14* -0.14* -0.14* 
Income -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
SatisfactionNatlGov 0.07* 0.07* 0.07* 0.07* 0.07* 0.07* 0.07* 0.07* 
PolInterest 0.62*** 0.62*** 0.62*** 0.62*** 0.62*** 0.62*** 0.62*** 0.62*** 
          
N 28,489 28,489 28,489 28,849 28,489 28,489 28,489 28,489 
Log Pseudolikelihood -15555.267 -15551.401 -15549.38 -15549.379 -15548.983 -15548.318 -1543.939 -15543.02 
country (var_cons) 2.038773 1.281944 1.005849 1.259625 0.97 1.073221 0.663987 0.6544306 
         





 All of the control variables included produce effects in the expected direction with the 
exception of income: being female and unemployed decreases the likelihood of supporting pro-
EU parties and more education, greater satisfaction with national government, and greater 
political interest increases it. Interestingly, income shows a negative sign, meaning that higher 
income individuals are less likely to support pro-EU parties. The effect of all but “Unemployed”, 
“SatisfactionNatlGov”, and “PolInterest” are consistently statistically insignificant across 
models.   
The results of this first analysis lend partial support to Hypothesis 3 and allow us to reject 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. Being young decreases the likelihood of supporting pro-EU parties, and in 
countries where a Eurosceptic party is in government, young people are even less likely to do so. 
Similarly, when limiting the analysis to the presence of TAN parties, we find no significant 
effect. However, the analysis of “hard” Eurosceptics produces expected results that suggest that 
in countries where these parties are in office, young people are more likely to support pro-EU 
parties. 
 
Results for Vote for Pro-EU Parties 
Table 4 shows results for eight multi-level logistic regression models on vote for pro-EU 
parties in each country’s most recent national election. Each of the Models are constructed 
according to the same method and order as for the previous analysis. The ICC for VoteProEU is 
0.07, explaining that 7% of the variation on the dependent variable can be attributed to between-




Table 4: Explaining Vote for Pro-EU Parties in 18 EU Member States 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Coefficient          
Constant -1.98 -1.84*** -1.90*** -1.90*** -1.83*** -1.84*** -1.87*** -1.83*** 
Age18to29 -0.70*** -0.80*** -0.79*** -0.78*** -0.80*** -0.80*** -0.82*** -0.80*** 
ESinGovt   -0.51**    -0.51* -0.36   -0.32 
Age18to29*ESinGovt   0.39     0.12  0.13   -0.26** 
TANinGovt     -0.45   -0.01  -0.30 -0.07 
Age18to29*TANinGovt     0.56**   0.45  0.40*** 0.58*** 
HardinGovt       -0.66***   -0.37 -0.56* -0.38 
Age18to29*HardinGovt       0.73***   0.63* 0.59*** 0.73*** 
Gender 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
Education 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** .12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
Unemployed -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.34*** -0.35*** -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.34*** 
Income 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
SatisfactionNatlGov 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
PolInterest 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 
                  
N 28,489 28,489 28,489 28,489 28,489 28,489 28,489 28,489 
Log Pseudolikelihood -17575.525 -17571.346 17571.708 17570.014 17570.376 17568.915 17567.754 17566.859 
country (var_cons) 0.2169421 0.1659301 0.1903659 0.1751994 0.1656348 0.1576468 0.1648239 0.1570645 
 
Note: *p  <  .05.  **p  <  .01 *** p <  .001         




As I expect, results are similar to the results presented above on support for pro-EU 
parties. The coefficient for Age18to29 is, again, consistently negative and significant across all 
eight models, indicating that being young decreases the likelihood of vote for pro-EU parties. 
This provides further support that we must reject Hypothesis 1. Also, the effect of presence of all 
Eurosceptic parties in the governing coalition does not reach the commonly applied levels of 
statistical significance until Model 8, when the interaction of age and ESinGovt produces a 
negative effect, again contradicting Hypothesis 2.    
However, the results here show even more support that the influence of TAN and “hard” 
Eurosceptic parties in office on young people’s likelihood of voting for pro-EU parties is 
positive. In Model 3, the log odds of the interaction between age and the variable TANinGovt is 
positive and statistically significant. Furthermore, when controlling for the presence of “hard” 
Eurosceptics and the full set of variables in Models 7 and 8, respectively, these results hold up. 
Similar results are found for “hard” Eurosceptic parties in Models 4, 6, 7, and 8. Again here, 
when “hard” Eurosceptic parties in government are considered alone, the log odds of voting for 
pro-EU parties are 0.73 and significant. This explanatory power is retained when controlling for 
the presence of all Eurosceptic parties in government (Model 6), TAN parties in government 
(Model 7), and the full set of variables (Model 8).  
The control variables demonstrate greater statistical significance than in the previous 
analysis of support for pro-EU parties. Here, however, gender demonstrates the opposite of 
expectations in the literature; females are more likely to vote for pro-EU parties. All other 
variables behave as expected, and all but income and expressing satisfaction with national 
government are statistically significant.  
 
 
Table 5: Explaining Interest in Further Integration in 18 EU Member States 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Coefficient         
Constant -2.16*** -2.00*** -2.10*** -2.16*** -2.00*** -2.01*** -2.11*** -2.00*** 
Age18to29 0.30*** 0.37*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.32*** 0.37*** 
ESinCoalition   -0.36     -0.23 -0.49   -0.39 
Age18to29*ESinGovt   -0.20*     -0.31*** -0.22*   -0.35*** 
TANinGovt     -0.34   -0.21  -0.38 -0.16 
Age18to29*TANinGovt     -0.06   0.19***   -0.03 0.21*** 
HardinGovt       0.00   0.34 0.14 0.31 
Age18to29*HardinGovt       -0.11   0.06 -0.10 0.09* 
Gender -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
Education 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
Unemployed -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Income 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
SatisfactionNatlGov 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
PolInterest 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 
                  











17706.677 -17706.64 -17711.1 -17706.18 
country (var_cons) 0.1890874 0.1406787 0.1724962 0.1890339 0.1380644 0.1343536 0.1707914 0.1325855 
         





In explaining the vote for pro-EU parties, I find support for Hypothesis 3 but need to 
reject Hypothesis 1 and 2. Counter to expectations, being young decreases the likelihood of 
voting for pro-EU parties, and the presence of any Eurosceptic parties in the governing coalition 
has no effect. Yet, we find that in limiting the variable to TAN Eurosceptics and “hard” 
Eurosceptics, the effect of age on vote for pro-EU parties is clear. In countries where these 
parties are present in the governing coalition, young people between 18 and 29-years-old are 
more likely to vote for pro-EU parties. 
 
Results for Interest in Further European Integration  
 Finally, results of eight multi-level logistic regression models on the third dependent 
variable of analysis, measuring interest in further European integration, are presented in Table 5. 
The ICC for SupportIntegration is 0.04, so 4% of the variation is attributable to between-country 
differences.  
 The results show that young people are more likely to want further integration. The log 
odds are consistently positive and significant, ranging from 0.30 in Model 1 to 0.37 in Models 2, 
5, 6, and 8. The addition of the presence of Eurosceptic parties in government and its interaction 
with age in Models 2, 5, 6 and 8 contradicts expectations in that in countries with a Eurosceptic 
government presence, young people are less likely to have an appetite for further integration. 
These results are statistically significant.  
 However, in keeping with previous findings, when we consider the presence of TAN 
parties, controlling for ESinGovt in Model 5 and the full set of variables in Model 8, results are 
significant and positive. The presence of a TAN party in the governing coalition increases the 
likelihood that young people will desire further integration. These results are partially duplicated 
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for “hard” Eurosceptic parties albeit being much weaker. In Model 8, when controlling for all 
other variables, “hard” Eurosceptic parties produce a positive significant effect; the log odds of 
wanting further integration are 0.09. However, the effects of the “hard” Eurosceptic party and 
age interaction term are insignificant in other models. Only controls for level of education, 
satisfaction with national government and degree of political interest are statistically significant, 
and each produce expected results.  
 This third analysis allows us to isolate pure attitudes toward European integration. As 
expected, young people are more likely to support further integration. However, contrary to what 
I hypothesized, in countries with any Eurosceptic party in the governing coalition, young people 
are less likely to support integration. This result is consistent with findings in the analyses of 
support for pro-EU parties and vote for pro-EU parties. Again here, however, there is strong 
evidence showing that this effect is reversed when TAN Eurosceptic parties are in government – 




 This analysis has shown that the electoral success of certain types of Eurosceptic parties 
at the national level increases the effect of age on likelihood to express pro-integration attitudes 
and support pro-EU parties. This effect is most consistent for “hard” Eurosceptic parties in the 
analysis of support for pro-EU parties and vote for pro-EU parties. The effect is also apparent for 
the presence of TAN Eurosceptic parties on the attitudinal measure of supporting integration.  
One particularly surprising finding is that young Europeans are less likely to support pro-
EU parties (by professing “closeness” and by vote choice). There are several potential 
explanations for this finding. First, young people are less likely to affiliate themselves with 
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political parties generally (Scarrow & Gezgor, 2010). Political party membership has declined 
across all age groups, but most significantly among the young (Bruter & Harrison, 2009). This 
would thereby also impact the likelihood that they support pro-EU parties, even when their 
attitudes are more aligned. The data used in this research limits our ability to fully flesh out this 
dichotomy, but there is evidence to support this assumption. The survey question directly 
preceding the question I used to assess which party respondents felt close to asks, “Is there a 
particular party you feel closer to than all the other parties?”. Respondents could answer “Yes”, 
“No”, “Refusal”, or “Don’t Know”. A simple cross-tab of age and this variable reveals that only 
34% of 18-to-29-year-olds feel close to a political party compared to 49% of those over 30 
(Table 6).  
 
Table 6: Party Support and Reported Vote by Age 
Close to Party? % Age 18-29 % Age 30+   Vote Last Election? % Age 18-29 % Age 30+ 
Yes 34% 49%   Yes 62% 79% 
No 66% 51%   No 38% 21% 
  
 
A second factor could be the well-established phenomenon that young people are less 
likely to vote. Again, we can look at the dataset for guidance as to whether, in this particular 
case, we see this phenomenon play out. The question in the 2016 European Social Survey 
directly preceding the question regarding which party respondents voted for in the last national 
election first establishes whether they voted at all, by asking, “Some people don’t vote nowadays 
for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last [country] national election in [month/year]? 
Respondents were able to select “Yes”, “No”, “Not eligible to vote”, “Refusal”, or “Don’t 
know”. Responses by age give a clear picture confirming extant research: just 62% of 18-to-29-
year-olds reported voting compared with 79% of over-30-year-olds. Thus, perhaps the results I 
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find that young people are less likely to support pro-EU parties by expressing “closeness” and in 
voting for them have more to do with the fact that young people are simply less likely to affiliate 
themselves with political parties generally and less likely to vote.  
 In assessing the inability to confirm Hypothesis 2, I find that the electoral success of the 
full range of Eurosceptic parties does not impact the relationship of age on support for 
integration or support for pro-EU parties. Given that I do find support for my latter hypothesis 
regarding “hard” Eurosceptic parties and TAN Eurosceptic parties, I surmise that the many 
differences between Eurosceptic parties may be the decisive factor. It is reasonable to expect that 
the inclusion of GAL and “soft” Eurosceptic parties in the broader definition of Eurosceptic 
parties may change the effect I expected. GAL parties, for example, are less likely to place 
emphasis on their Eurosceptic perspective as a primary component of their platform, so maybe 
the lower salience of the EU in countries where these parties are in office does not evoke a 
similar strong reaction from the young. Moreover, we know that young people are more likely to 
align themselves with postmaterialist values more typical of GAL Eurosceptic parties. Thus, it 
stands to reason that these types of parties would be less threatening to them, lessening the 
motivation for young people to turn to pro-EU parties as an alternative. 
Another plausible explanation is that mainstream parties may react differently to GAL 
and “soft” parties than they do to TAN and “hard” Eurosceptic parties, thereby changing the 
appeal of certain mainstream parties to young voters. Prior research has confirmed that the 
emergence and electoral success of Eurosceptic parties does change mainstream party 
positioning on Europe (Meijers, 2015). Challenger parties act as “issue entrepreneurs” in 
introducing new topics of discussion to the political agenda and forcing mainstream parties to 
engage on the issue (de Vries & Hobolt, 2012; Abou-Chadi, 2014). Additionally, the issue that 
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the challenger party emphasizes is important. Right-leaning mainstream parties react especially 
to anti-immigrant challenger parties by becoming more protectionist, while the emergence of 
green party fringe success (often aligned with GAL Eurosceptic parties) causes mainstream 
parties to deemphasize the issue of the environment given their secondary issue ownership 
(Abou-Chadi, 2014). These findings show that emerging Eurosceptic parties influence the policy 
positioning of mainstream parties, which may cause voters to realign their support. Young 
people tend to be increasingly driven by issues in political-decision making rather than party 
identification, so it is likely that changing issue ownership and issue positioning would produce a 
stronger tendency to change patterns of support among the young (Norris, 2002).  
Clearly, the opportunities for further research on this topic are extensive, and the 
importance of future study cannot be understated. This analysis only included a study of 18 EU 
member countries. Extending the analysis to all 28 member countries would be helpful in 
establishing more universal conclusions. Similarly, results here are based on just one year with 
the young people we study an exclusive representation of the Millennial generation, limiting our 
ability to see how the relationship differs across time and how it might vary based on generation 
versus life cycle. More substantively, examining how Eurosceptic party success may impact 
young people’s political participation habits would be an important contribution in establishing 
how changing youth attitudes may shape politics electorally. 
The rise of Eurosceptic parties at the national level shows no sign of abating, so it is 
critical that we better understand how various populations – particularly those that have 
traditionally been the most supportive, like the young – will react to these evolving political 
realities. The finding that the success of “hard” and TAN Eurosceptic parties at the national level 
galvanizes young people to increase their support of the European integration project and pro-EU 
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parties is profound. Today’s young people represent the future of Europe, and these results 
suggest that despite recent challenges to the European integration project, there is still hope for 
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